

Trust – the root of evil?!

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About Me

- Studies in Business Administration and Computer Science
- Focus on IT Security
- Working as IT Specialist for Customer Care and Lifecycle Support




What We Talk About Today


1. PKI & CA Basics
2. The 2011 Cases
3. CAcert as Open Alternative



PKI Basics




What Is A CA?



Trust Anchor 1/2

Hierarchical CA




Trust anchor 2/2

Cross-Certified CAs



Bridged CAs



What happened in 2011



Security of Dutch government in jeopardy

Published on 3 September 2011 - 12:33am

More about: [Diginotar](#) [Dutch government](#) [Dutch politics](#) [Holland](#) [internet](#) [Donner](#)

The Dutch Interior Minister Piet Hein Donner said on Saturday morning after an internet security breach that hackers had accessed the government's internal network.

What Happened

Comodo detected and thwarted an intrusion into a reseller user account on 26-MAR-2011. The new controls implemented by Comodo following the incident on 15-MAR-2011 removed any risk of the fraudulent issue of certificates. We believed the attack was from the same perpetrator as the incident on 15-MAR-2011.

News-Meldung vom 05.11.2011 14:35

Zertifikatsausgabestopp nach Einbruch auf einen KPN-Server

Compromising Certificate Authority compromises and web browser

Posted March 22nd, 2011 by ioerror in

How the Comodo certificate fraud calls CA trust into question

By Peter Bright | Published 10 months ago

Web credential authority rebuilt

Digicert Malaysia banished from Chrome

By Dan Goodin in San Francisco - Get more from

Posted in Enterprise Security - 2011 21:46 GMT

Revoking Trust in DigiCert Sdn. Bhd Intermediate Certificate Authority

© 11.03.11 - 10:56am

Why do commercial CAs fail?

- Only basic verification of subscriber
- Certificates without any verification possible
- Reselling of CA-Services
 - Lack of control over the Intermediate CAs
 - Policies are not enforced over the trust chain
- Usage of weak keys is unknown to the public
- Server intrusion is not communicated



Browsers still trust these CAs!

Lessons Learned?

What need to be done:

- Open Policies & open Governance
- Transparent Processes
- IT Security and Data Protection
- Exact Identity Check

There is one open and free CA that lives this:



How about CAcert?

CAcert protects its RA by

- Identification following policies
- Identification checked by at least 2 assurers
- arbitration

Registration Authority

CAcert protects its CA by

- Two-Men rule
- Open Source with code reviews
- Audit log of certificate creation

Certificate Authority

The Main Question



When does CAcert gets into the browsers?



Questions & Answers

Your Questions, Please!

Thank You For Your Attention!

Visit us at <https://cacert.org>

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